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I. INTRODUCTION 
“‘. . . [W]e should make something like that, something with that groove.’”1  
When R&B singer-songwriter Robin Thicke stated those now infamous words 
in a May 2013 interview for GQ magazine, he was at the height of his music 
career.  His new single, “Blurred Lines,” featuring T.I. and Pharrell Williams, was 
a chart-topping sensation.2  With an upbeat tempo and rhythmic hook, the song 
was an instant hit, catching the attention of a wide audience of music listeners, 
and it quickly became apparent that its popularity would be anything but short-
lived.  After its successful debut, “Blurred Lines” continued to hold the number 
one spot on Billboard’s Hot 100, R&B, Hip-Hop, and Pop charts, while steadily 
climbing to the top of others, making it Billboard’s “Song of the Summer.”3  
Furthermore, the accompanying music video was equally, if not more, successful, 
as it went viral with more than 62 million views in three months.4  Clearly, the 
“groove” that inspired Thicke was something special—or was it?   
This “groove” Thicke mentioned in the GQ interview was a tribute to Marvin 
Gaye’s 1977 hit “Got To Give It Up.”5  When asked to describe the origin of his 
new single “Blurred Lines,” Thicke recalled a conversation he had in the studio 
with collaborator Pharrell Williams.6  Specifically, Thicke said he stated to 
Williams that “one of [his] favorite songs of all time was Marvin Gaye’s ‘Got To 
Give It Up,’” and he and Williams “should make something like that, something 
with that groove.”7  Within a half-hour of experimenting with the “groove,” 
Thicke and Williams wrote “Blurred Lines,” and the entire song was recorded 
and finished within two hours.8  At the time, Thicke likely considered his 
 
 1  Stelios Phili, Robin Thicke on That Banned Video, Collaborating with 2 Chainz and Kendrick 
Lamar, and His New Film, GQ (May 7, 2013), https://www.gq.com/story/robin-thicke-
interview-blurred-lines-music-video-collaborating-with-2-chainz-and-kendrick-lamar-mercy. 
 2  Gary Trust, Robin Thicke’s ‘Blurred Lines’ is Billboard’s Song of the Summer, BILLBOARD (Sept. 
5, 2013), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/5687036/robin-thickes-blurred-lines-is-
billboards-song-of-the-summer (discussing the immediate success of “Blurred Lines” on 
Billboard’s music charts). 
 3  Id. 
 4  Jason Lipshutz, Robin Thicke, Miley Cyrus, & Clearing Up Blurred Lines in Music Videos 
(Opinion), BILLBOARD (June 25, 2013),  https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/pop-
shop/1568125/robin-thicke-miley-cyrus-clearing-up-blurred-lines-in-music-videos 
(discussing the public reception of Robin Thicke’s provocative music video for his hit single, 
“Blurred Lines”). 
 5  See MARVIN GAYE – “GOT TO GIVE IT UP (PT.1)”, CLASSIC MOTOWN, 
https://classic.motown.com/story/marvin-gaye-got-give-pt-1(last visited Sept. 22, 2020, 3:28 
p.m.) (providing an overview of the writing, recording, and production of Marvin Gaye’s “Got 
To Give It Up” and the “Blurred Lines” copyright infringement controversy). 
 6  Phili, supra note 1. 
 7  Id. 
 8  Id. 
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interview answer a harmless, typical response to a common question in the music 
industry.  He, like many other R&B singer-songwriters, clearly admired Gaye’s 
music and likely considered him a creative influence for his artistry and craft.  
Therefore, what was the harm in describing the inspiration for the song he and 
Williams created?  
However, after the interview was published, Thicke was confronted with 
backlash from members of Marvin Gaye’s estate, who claimed that “Blurred 
Lines” copied the composition of Gaye’s “Got To Give It Up.”9  In response to 
the accusations that this hit single was not an original, the “Blurred Lines” 
collaborators filed suit against the Gaye family and Bridgeport Music, Inc.10 in 
California federal court in August 2013.11  They sought a declaratory judgment 
that their composition did not infringe on Gaye’s 1977 hit.12  In March 2018, 
after a five-year legal battle of counter-claims and appeals, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals settled the matter.13  The court affirmed the California District 
Court’s verdict that Thicke and Williams were liable for copyright infringement 
and awarded the Gaye family $5.3 million in damages.14   
Upon the announcement of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, panic spread 
throughout the entertainment industry.  Many began to fear that the Ninth 
 
 9  Eriq Gardner, Robin Thicke Sues to Protect ‘Blurred Lines’ from Marvin Gaye’s Family 
(Exclusive), HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Aug. 15, 2013), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/robin-thicke-sues-protect-blurred-607492 
(providing overview of filing of initial lawsuit by Marvin Gaye’s estate). 
 10  Bridgeport Music, Inc. is a music publishing company founded in Michigan in 1969. The 
company was initially included as a defendant because it alleged separately that “Blurred Lines” 
was an infringement of Funkadelic’s hit song “Sexy Ways.” See Eriq Gardner, Funkadelic’s ‘Sexy’ 
Dropped From ‘Blurred Lines’ Lawsuit, BILLBOARD (Mar. 27, 2014), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/6028892/funkadelics-sexy-ways-dropped-from-
blurred-lines-lawsuit (discussing the removal of Bridgeport Music, Inc. from The Blurred Lines 
Case). 
 11  Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 2:13CV06004, 
2013 WL 4271752 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013). Initially, the case was filed by Thicke and 
Williams as Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. LA CV13-06004 JAK (AGRx), 2015 WL 
4479500, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 2015). On appeal, the parties agreed to dismiss Bridgeport Music, 
Inc. from the case; therefore, the case proceeded as Williams v. Gaye. See Eriq Gardner, ‘Blurred 
Lines’ Lawsuit No Longer Involves Funkadelic’s ‘Sexy Ways’, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Mar. 27, 
2014), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/blurred-lines-lawsuit-no-longer-
691729. Due to the high amount of media exposure surrounding the litigation, the matter 
became popularly known as The Blurred Lines Case. For the sake of convenience, this Note 
adopts this nomenclature going forward. 
 12  See Gardner, supra note 9 (discussing the allegations contained in Pharrell Williams and 
Robin Thicke’s initial complaint in The Blurred Lines Case). 
 13  See Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018)(affirming district court’s judgement 
that Williams and Thicke infringed “Got To Give It Up.”). 
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Circuit’s decision could establish a precedent that a “vibe, feeling, or genre” of 
music, elements that traditionally are not covered by copyright, would now be 
subject to protection.15  Therefore, many contend that The Blurred Lines Case 
could ultimately result in a “chilling effect” on creativity16 because it would 
encourage litigants to base infringement suits on the “feel” of the song as 
opposed to how “it is actually written.”17 
As one of the most controversial and high-profile copyright infringement 
suits of the decade, The Blurred Lines Case and its possible implications for the 
music industry have received thorough examination by pundits, academics, and 
lawyers alike.18  Moreover, the fear that immediately paralyzed an entire field of 
artists still pervades the music industry post-Blurred Lines.  In fact, the increased 
number of infringement suits and substantial damage awards for plaintiffs since 
the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the Gaye family have worsened this fear.19  
 
 15  Ed Christman, ‘Blurred Lines’ Verdict: How It Started, Why It Backfired on Robin Thicke and 
Why Songwriters Should be Nervous, BILLBOARD (Mar. 13, 2015), 
https://www.billboard.com/articles/business/6502023/blurred-lines-verdict-how-it-started-
why-it-backfired-on-robin-thicke-and; see also Olivia Lattanza, The Blurred Protection for the Feel 
or Groove of a Song under Copyright Law: Examining the Implications of Williams v. Gaye on Creativity in 
Music, 35 TOURO L. REV. 723, 726 (2019)(asserting that “the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of the 
jury’s decision inappropriately expanded the scope of copyright protection to the feel or 
groove of a song,” which will “substantially diminish the creative output of artists.”). 
 16  Megan Coane & Maximillian Verrelli, Blurred Lines? The Practical Implications of Williams v. 




also Regrettable Denouement in the “Blurred Lines” Dispute, GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW BLOGS: 
MUSIC INFRINGEMENT RESOURCE, https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/robin-
thicke-sues-protect-blurred-607492 (discussing the potential “chilling effect” on creativity and 
the rise in similar, opportunistic claims following the Ninth Circuit’s decision in The Blurred 
Lines Case). 
 17  See Christman, supra note 15. 
 18  See, e.g., Regina Zernay, Casting the First Stone: The Future of Infringement Law After Blurred 
Lines, Stay with Me, and Uptown Funk, 20 CHAP. L.R. 177 (2017) (analyzing the current state 
of music law and determining whether any significant change has occurred in the way 
copyright infringement suits are resolved); see Edwin F. McPherson, Crushing Creativity: The 
Blurred Lines Case and Its Aftermath, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 67, 68 (2018)(arguing that 
the “Blurred Lines” songwriters were found liable for an idea rather than a tangible expression 
of an idea as required by the Copyright Act (the Act); thus, to preserve the intent of the Act, 
courts must provide clearer rules for songwriters); see Coane & Verrelli, supra note 16; see also 
Tim Wu, Why the “Blurred Lines” Copyright Verdict Should Be Thrown Out, NEW YORKER,(Mar. 12, 
2015), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/why-the-blurred-lines-copyright-
verdict-should-be-thrown-outd (arguing that the Blurred Lines Case verdict should be “thrown 
out” because “to say something ‘sounds like’ something else does not amount to copyright 
infringement”). 
 19  See Jem Aswad, Katy Perry’s ‘Dark Horse’ Case and Its Chilling Effect on Songwriting, VARIETY 
(Aug. 6, 2019), https://variety.com/2019/biz/news/katy-perry-dark-horse-lawsuit-joyful-
5
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However, music is just one area of copyright law.  Was it possible that other 
creative industries should share this concern as well?  
This Note seeks to examine the following questions: given the rise of 
copyright infringement claims in the music industry and the substantial 
uncertainty surrounding creativity that exists in this area of copyright law after 
The Blurred Lines Case, can artists expect this trend to spread to other types of 
protected creative works, in particular, motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works?  Or, is it more probable that the implications of The Blurred Lines Case will 
remain contained within the music industry?  In the case of the latter, does this 
mean that different kinds of creative works are treated differently under 
copyright?  If so, should this disparity be permitted?   
By conducting a thorough analysis of  The Blurred Lines holding, its 
implications, and copyright law, this Note argues that the results of the present 
case is unlikely to spread to other areas of copyright law.  Part II provides a 
general background of copyright law.  Part II also provides a more detailed 
discussion of The Blurred Lines Case, to serve as context for stating and analyzing 
the questions presented here.  
In Part III, this Note conducts an analysis of the current state of other areas 
of copyright law, focusing on film, motion pictures, and other audio-visual 
works.  Specifically, this section will analyze case law to determine what facts, 
arguments, and methods of reasoning are typically presented by plaintiffs in these 
kinds of infringement lawsuits.  Then, it will assess the relative success of these 
plaintiffs in obtaining verdicts in their favor.  After this undertaking, this Note 
predicts how the implications of The Blurred Lines Case are not likely to spread 
beyond the film industry.  Part III of this Note then argues that the application 
of copyright protection varies across different types of creative works.  Finally, 










noise-chilling-effect-on-songwriting-1203292606/ (arguing that the increase in substantial 
verdicts in music copyright infringement cases post-Blurred Lines reveals a need to eliminate 
the role of the jury in future cases). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. COPYRIGHT LAW 
1. Source and Purpose of U.S. Copyright Law 
U.S. copyright law begins with Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution, which is commonly referred to as “the Copyright and Patent 
Clause.”20  This clause provides that Congress “shall have Power . . . to promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”21 
The Court has generally interpreted the Copyright Clause to mean that the 
purpose of copyright protection is to “enrich[] the general public through access 
to creative works,”22 and to “motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors by the provision of a special reward”23 that exists “in the form of 
control over the sale or commercial use of copies of their works.”24  Thus, these 
characterizations of the Copyright Clause demonstrate that the authority to grant 
copyright to an individual rests “on the dual premises that the public benefits 
from the creative activities of authors and that copyright protection is a necessary 
condition to the full realization of those creative activities.”25  This rationale 
allows for the implicit assumption that “absent a public benefit, the grant of 
copyright to individuals would be unjustified.”26 
The Copyright Clause gives Congress the power to enact legislation “to 
provide copyright protection to the extent [it] sees fit.”27  That is, copyright is 
protected solely by statute, as the Constitution neither confers nor requires 




 20  18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 1 (2020) (citing Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 
302 (2012); Luck’s Music Library, Inc. v. Gonzales, 407 F.3d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
 21  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 [hereinafter the Copyright Clause]. 
 22  Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1982 (2016)(quoting Fogerty v. 
Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994)). 
 23  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 24  Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1973) (emphasis added). 
 25  1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (Matthew 
Bender, Rev. Ed.). 
 26  Id. (citing Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 776 F.3d 692,698 (9th Cir. 
2015)(Wardlaw, J., concurring)). 
 27  18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Property § 1 (2020) (citing Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 
277 (4th Cir. 2007)). 
 28  Id. at § 3 (citing Darden, 488 F.3d 277 and Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 
881 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 430 (explaining how “the protection given to 
copyrights is wholly statutory”). 
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2. Development of U.S. Copyright Law 
In 1790, the First Congress brought forth the principles of the Copyright 
Clause by enacting the first copyright law, the Copyright Act of 1790.29  The 
initial scope of the 1790 Act was “relatively limited,” offering protection for 
“books, maps, and charts for a period of only fourteen years with a renewal 
period for another fourteen years.”30  Congress amended the 1790 act several 
times throughout the nineteenth century, changing the scope of protected works, 
duration of protection, and the registration process.31  For example, the 
amendments expanded the scope of protection to include “historical and other 
prints,” dramatic works, photographs, visual art, and expanded the exclusive 
rights of authors to include the right of public performance for dramatic works 
and musical compositions and the right to create derivative works.32 
The next major copyright legislation passed by Congress was the Copyright 
Act of 1909.33  Signed into law by President Theodore Roosevelt, the key features 
of this legislation included both a copyright term and  renewal term of 28 years, 
and also granted the author the ability to terminate any transfer of their copyright 
between the initial and renewal periods.34  The 1909 Act experienced three 
significant phases of amendment.35  First, three years after its enactment, the 
1909 Act was amended to extend protection to motion pictures.36  Second, in 
1953, the 1909 Act was further amended to extend recording and performing 
rights to nondramatic literary works.37  Finally, in 1972, Congress again extended 
copyright protection to sound recordings that were fixed and first published after 
the date of enactment.38  
In October 1976, President Gerald Ford signed the first and most recent 
major revision of copyright law since 1909: the Copyright Act of 1976 (“the 1976 
Act”).39  The 1976 Act significantly changed modern copyright law because it 
 
 29  Timeline of Copyright Law in the United States: Eighteenth Century, U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFFICE, https://www.copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_18th_century.html (last visited Sept. 
24, 2020). 
 30  Id. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Id. 
 33  An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 
35 Stat. 1075 (1909). 
 34  Timeline of Copyright Law in the United States: 1900-1950, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
https://www.copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_1900-1950.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2020). 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. 
 38  Id. 
 39  Timeline of Copyright Law in the United States: 1950-1997, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
https://www.copyright.gov/timeline/timeline_1950-1997.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2020). 
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greatly altered the term of protection for new works.40  Rather than protecting 
works for a term of years with a renewal period, the 1976 Act provided that new 
works created on or after January 1, 1978 were protected for the life of the author 
plus seventy years.41  Additionally, the right to terminate transfer of the copyright 
between the initial and renewal terms was eliminated and replaced with the right 
to terminate transfer after 35 years, subject to specific procedures.42  
While the 1976 Act remains the current statutory authority on copyright law 
in the United States, Congress has amended it multiple times since its 
enactment.43  These revisions have primarily occurred in response to rapidly 
changing technologies; for example, given the creation of new mediums of 
expression, Congress has added protection for computer programs.44  
Amendments to the 1976 Act have also occurred to reflect the United States’ 
treaty obligations with other nations, such as the Berne Convention and the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works.45  
Thus, as copyright law has evolved in the United States, protection under the 
1976 Act has greatly expanded.46  After years of legislative efforts, in an ever-
advancing world, to comport statutory law with the principles of the Copyright 
Clause, the thrust of the 1976 Act’s protection is summarized as follows:  
authors of original expression shall enjoy the exclusive right to 
(1) copy their work; (2) distribute copies to the public; (3) prepare 
“derivative works” based upon their work, including translations, 
motion picture versions of novels, arrangements, abridgements, 
and the like; (4) publicly perform their work, including live 
performances, broadcasts, and streaming over the Internet; and 
(5) publicly display their work, including displaying artwork in 
public places on websites.47 
3. Substantive Requirements and Subject Matter of Copyright 
The summary of provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act given above dictates 
what rights are available to authors under the statute.  The following paragraphs 
will explain how authors may assert these exclusive rights.  First, this Note will 
discuss the substantive requirements of copyright protection.  Second, given 
 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id. 
 42  Id. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Id. 
 45  Id. 
 46  NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 1 
(2018). 
 47  Id. at 3. 
9
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these requirements, this Note will list the kinds of works that may be protected 
by copyright. 
There are two main requirements that must be met for a creative work to be 
subject to copyright.  First, the 1976 Act provides protection for “original works 
of authorship.”48  The modern statute fails to provide a definition for what 
constitutes “originality.”  However, the relevant House Report explained that 
this omission was purposeful because the legislature intended to incorporate 
without changing the standard of originality established by courts under the 1909 
Act.49 
Since the 1909 Act also lacked a definition for originality, courts filled in the 
gap by uniformly inferring the originality requirement from the fact that 
copyright could only be claimed by “‘authors’ (or their successors in interest).”50  
Specifically, courts reasoned that since the author is the “‘originator’” or 
“‘beginner’” and “‘first mover of anything’ . . . [,] a work is not a product of an 
author unless it is original.”51  Thus, courts construe the meaning of originality 
to mean “only that the work owes its origin to [its] author, i.e., is independently 
created rather than copied from other works.”52 
Second, in order to be eligible for protection under the statute, the original 
work must be “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”53  This language 
simply requires a work of original authorship to have some physical 
manifestation.54  This “broad language” was used to “avoid . . . artificial and 
largely unjustifiable distinctions,” where “statutory copyrightability” in some 
cases “was made to depend upon the form or medium in which the work was 
fixed.”55  Therefore, under the 1976 Act, “it makes no difference what the form, 
manner, or medium of fixation may be.”56  
Taken together, these two requirements allow the following conclusion: so 
long as a creative work owes its origin to the author, and it has been fixed in 
some form of tangible medium through which “the work can be perceived and 
communicated,”57 the requirements of the statute are satisfied, and copyright 
protection is triggered.58  As indicated in the language of the statute, the 
 
 48  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2019). 
 49  1 NIMMER, supra note 25, at §2.01[A] (quoting H.R. REP NO. 94–1476, at 51 (1976)). 
 50  Id. at 2 (citing An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Acts Respecting Copyright, Pub. 
L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)). 
 51  Id. (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 351-52 (1991); 
Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Mgmt. Sols., Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2002)). 
 52  Id. (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 345). 
 53  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2019). 
 54  1 NIMMER, supra note 25, at § 1.08. 
 55  H.R. REP NO. 94–1476, at 52 (1976). 
 56  Id. 
 57  NETANEL, supra note 46, at 5. 
 58  Id. 
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following categories of works of authorship may be subject to copyright 
protection: (1) literary works; (2) musical works; (3) dramatic works; (4) 
pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic and sculptural 
works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; 
and (8) architectural works.59 
 
4. Establishing a Copyright Infringement Claim 
To establish a claim for copyright infringement, a party must satisfy two 
requirements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) that another person or 
entity copied  the constituent elements of the work that are original.60  It is 
generally accepted as impossible to prove prong two’s infringement requirement 
by direct evidence because the availability of a witness testifying to copying rarely 
exists.61  Therefore, a party may use circumstantial evidence to prove an infringer 




Courts may define “access” as “the actual viewing and knowledge” of a 
protected work.63  Similar to the difficulty of establishing direct evidence of 
copying, plaintiffs may also find it near impossible to show that the defendant 
actually viewed or had knowledge of the work.64  Thus, courts have determined 
that, if actual evidence of access is unavailable, showing that the defendant had 
an opportunity to view the work is sufficient to allow the factfinder to conclude 
copying as a factual matter.65  
The implication of this allowance is that the factfinder has the discretion to 
disregard a defendant’s uncontroverted testimony that no such access was 
available at all.66  Thus, this approach may be fairly characterized as guaranteeing 
plaintiffs a finding of infringement.67  However, it is important to note that 
opportunity to view a work “does not encompass any bare possibility in the sense 
that anything is possible.”68  Instead, “there must be a reasonable possibility of 
 
 59  17 U.S.C. § 102 (2019). 
 60  Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991) (citing Harper v. 
Row, 471 U.S. 539 at 548 (1985)). 
 61  4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 
13.01[B](Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.). 
 62  Id. 
 63  Id. at § 13.02[A]. 
 64  Id. 
 65  Id. 
 66  Id. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Id. 
11
Patton: From Blurred Lines to Blurred Law: An Assessment of the Possible
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2021
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/12/2021  6:40 AM 
262 J. INTELL. PROP. L. [Vol. 28:1 
viewing plaintiff’s work,” rather than a “bare” one.69  Distinguishing a 
“reasonable” from a “bare” possibility is “anything but straightforward, which 
often makes the determination a “close question.”70 
As indicated above, plaintiffs in a copyright infringement suit are typically 
required to demonstrate access and substantial similarity.71  However, where the 
similarity between two works is so “sufficiently striking” that the “only 
explanation for the similarities . . . must be ‘copying rather than … coincidence, 
independent creation, or prior common source,’”72 the factfinder “may . . . infer 
copying on that basis alone.”73  This concept is known as the “Inverse Ratio 
Rule,” and its acceptance and degree of application varies widely among federal 
circuit courts.74  
 
b. Substantial Similarity 
Substantial similarity is just as, if not more, vital to a plaintiff’s infringement 
claim.75  This question is also one of the more complicated areas of copyright 
law.76  Specifically, courts find it both “difficult to define and vague to apply”77 
given Congress’ lack of statutory guidance  and the Supreme Court’s silence as 
to what constitutes “substantial.”  The analysis has ultimately been left to the 
discretion of the lower courts; consequently, a wide range of approaches are 
comprised in case law.78  
Nevertheless, the vital inquiry here concerns “improper appropriation,” and 
while approaches may vary, it is generally understood that a “slight” or “trivial” 
similarity is not considered “substantial.” 79  Yet, “exact reproduction” or “near 
identity” are not necessary.80  One potentially instructive way to conceptualize 
this element of an infringement claim is in terms of what the work is not.  For 
example, where there is no dispute as to the validity of the plaintiff’s copyright, 
access, or the “very strong resemblances” between two works, a court may find 
 
 69  Id. 
 70  Id. 
 71  Id. at § 13.01[B]. 
 72  Id. at § 13.02[B] (citations omitted). 
 73  Id. 
 74  Id. at § 13.03[D]. 
 75  Id. at § 13.03[A]. 
 76  Id. 
 77  2 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 6:70 (2d ed. 2011). 
 78  See id. (“Several approaches, some interrelated, are taken by courts in analyzing works 
for substantial similarity.”). 
 79  4 NIMMER, supra note 61, at § 13.03[A]. 
 80  MILLS, supra note 77. 
12
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol28/iss1/10
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE) 1/12/2021  6:40 AM 
2020] IMPLICATIONS OF WILLIAMS V. GAYE 263 
that substantial similarity is lacking where the defendant copied only the 
unprotected elements of the plaintiff’s work.81  
 
5. Limits of Copyright Protection 
The preceding paragraphs provided an overview of the development of 
copyright law in the United States and an explanation of both the scope and 
substantive requirements of protection.  While the general trend in this area of 
law may be fairly characterized as an expansion and responsiveness to 
advancement, several limitations on protection have remained constant.  The 
most relevant limitation for the purposes of this Note is the “idea/expression 
dichotomy”.82  This phrase refers to the longstanding principle of copyright law 
that protection “extends only to the form in which an author expresses her ideas, 
not to the ideas themselves.”83 
The idea/expression dichotomy, which was codified in the 1976 Act84, seeks 
to strike a balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act “by 
permitting the free communication of facts while still protecting an author’s 
expression.”85  When construing the statute, the Supreme Court has held that 
“no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates,”86 because 
“[c]opyright laws are not restrictions on freedom of speech.”87  Rather, as the 
Court has explained, “the Framers intended copyright itself to be the engine of 
free expression,” because in creating “a marketable right to the use of one’s 
expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate 
ideas.”88  Thus, the economic philosophy underlying the Copyright Clause “is 
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the 
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors.”89 
Despite the widespread reliance on the idea/expression dichotomy by courts, 
many commentators consider it an illusory distinction.90  For instance, critics 
 
 81  4 NIMMER, supra note 61, at § 13.03[A] (citing Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 
F.3d 95, 101-02 (2d Cir. 2014)). 
 82  NETANEL, supra note 46, at 2. 
 83  Id. 
 84  See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2019) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work 
of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, 
or embodied in such work.”). 
 85  Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985). 
 86  Id. 
 87  Id. (citing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 726 (1971)). 
 88  Id. at 558. 
 89  Id. (quoting Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)). 
 90  See Richard H. Jones, The Myth of the Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 10 PACE 
L. REV. 551, 552-553 (1990)(arguing that “the distinction between the idea and expression 
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contend that the relationship between idea and expression is best conceptualized 
as a continuum because the difference between the two is not binary.91  It is one 
of degree.92  The idea-expression dichotomy is also considered impracticable 
because courts and commentators consistently fail to “define or clarify exactly 
what they mean” when using the terms “idea” and “expression.”93  This aspect 
of copyright law is not the focus of this Note; therefore, further elaboration of 
the idea/expression dichotomy debate is unnecessary.  However, acknowledging 
its presence in the copyright landscape leads this discussion to the next major 
area of relevant background information: The Blurred Lines Case.  
B. THE BLURRED LINES CASE 
1. The Blurred Lines Case: Factual Background and Procedural History 
The Blurred Lines Case started with a preemptive strike by the three composers 
of the hit single from which the litigation derives its name: Robin Thicke, Pharrell 
Williams, and T.I.94  The trio filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment 
that they were not liable for copyright infringement in response to a 
communication from Marvin Gaye’s estate that (1) they believed that the trio’s 
“Blurred Lines” infringed on Gaye’s “Got To Give It Up,” and (2) if the trio did 
not pay a monetary settlement of the Gaye estate’s claim, the Gaye estate would 
initiate litigation for copyright infringement.95  
The trio argued that the Gaye estate’s claims did not constitute a basis for 
copyright infringement because “being reminiscent of a ‘sound’ is not copyright 
infringement.”96  More specifically, they contended that the intent in creating 
“‘Blurred Lines’ was to evoke an era.”97  Thus, “the Gaye defendants are claiming 
ownership of an entire genre, as opposed to a specific work.”98  This preemptive 
 
dichotomy is misguided and irrelevant.”); see also Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the Myth of 
Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value Judgements, 66 IND. L. 
J. 175 (1990)(evaluating how subjective artistic values held by judges affect determinations of 
copyright infringement). 
 91  Jones, supra note 90, at 578, 598. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. at 565. 
 94 See supra Part I (summarizing the events that led to the filing of this lawsuit). 
 95  Id.; see also Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 2, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. 
CV13-06004-JAK (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013), 2013 WL 4271752 (seeking a declaratory 
judgment that Williams and Thicke’s composition did not infringe on Gaye’s 1977 hit). 
 96  Complaint for Declaratory Relief at 2, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. CV13-
06004-JAK (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2013), 2013 WL 4271752. 
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. 
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strike prompted a counterclaim by the Gaye estate alleging that “Blurred Lines” 
infringed on Gaye’s “Got To Give It Up.”99 
After losing on their motion for summary judgment, the case proceeded to 
trial.  The jury found the “Blurred Lines” composers liable for copyright 
infringement and awarded the Gaye Estate $4 million in damages and $3.7 
million in profits.100  Due to the publication of “Got to Give It Up” before 1978, 
the old statutory framework of the 1909 Copyright Act applied instead of the 
1976 Act.101  Therefore, the court ruled that protection afforded by the older 
statutory framework did not extend to the commercial sound recordings of “Got 
to Give It Up” or “Blurred Lines.”102  
After the verdict announcement, many artists, reporters, industry insiders, 
and experts voiced various critiques.103  In addition to the common contention 
that the denial of the “Blurred Lines” songwriters’ motion for summary 
judgment was improper, the main criticism was that the jury instructions were 
erroneous.104  Critics asserted that the judge blurred the distinction of what 
constitutes copyright infringement by failing to instruct the jury to limit its 
evaluation to only the protectable elements of copyright.105  This presumptively 
allowed the jury to consider copying an idea as infringement.106  Also, many felt 
that the jury went beyond the scope of the evidence by subconsciously 
incorporating the inadmissible sound recordings.107  The two songs were 
erroneously played during the course of the Gayes’ expert testimony.108  
Therefore, to many, it appeared as though the jury reached a conclusion 




 99  John Quagliariello, Blurring the Lines: The Impact of Williams v. Gaye on Music Composition, 10 
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 133, 137 (2019). 
 100  Id. at 138; see also Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1118 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 101  Quagliariello, supra note 99, 137-38. 
 102  Id. 
 103  Id. at 138. 
 104  See Coane & Verrelli, supra note 16 (arguing that the “misleading and inconsistent” jury 
instructions in The Blurred Lines Case were a deciding factor in the verdict against Thicke and 
Williams). 
 105  See id. (discussing how the jury was told that they could find infringement if “they 
perceive that the ‘total concept and feel’ of the two works are ‘substantially similar.’”). 
 106  See id. (explaining how critical reactions to The Blurred Lines Case spurred from the 
impression that the court had found that paying homage to a “vibe and/or feel” or “genre” 
of a previously released and inadmissible master recording constitutes infringement:  “[t]his 
should not have been the case, as many of those elements were excluded as evidence by virtue 
of the sound recordings [under the 1909 Act].”). 
 107  Quagliariello, supra note 99, at 139. 
 108  Id. 
 109  Id. at 138. 
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2. The Blurred Lines Case: The Appellate Decision 
a. The Majority 
Despite the widespread expectation  that the “Blurred Lines” songwriters 
would win on appeal,110 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury’s verdict in part and 
upheld the remitted damages award for the Gaye Estate.111  The majority rejected 
the “Blurred Lines” parties’ contention that the Gayes’ copyright enjoyed only 
“thin protection,” stating that “[m]usical compositions are not confined to a 
narrow range of expression.”112  The majority explained that music is “comprised 
of a large array of elements, some combination of which is protectable by 
copyright.”113  Therefore, a party need only demonstrate through expert 
testimony that the similarity between two works is (1) “substantial” and (2) “to 
the protectable elements.”114  Because the Gayes were not required to prove 
“virtual identity” to establish their infringement claim, the court subjected their 
copyright to broad protection.115 
Moreover, the majority stated that their decision was a narrow one, and that 
it “turned on the procedural posture of the case.”116  Thus, because a high degree 
of deference was given to findings of the judge and jury during the trial, the 
majority found that the district court did not  misstate the law in instructing the 
jury.117  Additionally, the majority concluded that the district court did not abuse  
its discretion in formulating the instructions.118  The majority also found that the 
district court did not fail to improperly include the commercial sound recordings 
of the two works,119 did not improperly admit expert testimony based on 
unprotected elements,120 and that the jury’s verdict was not against the clear 





 110  See Tim Wu, Why the “Blurred Lines” Verdict Should be Thrown Out, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 
12, 2015, https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/why-the-blurred-lines-
copyright-verdict-should-be-thrown-out (predicting that the ruling against Thicke and 
Williams will be reversed because “to say that something ‘sounds like’ something else does not 
amount to copyright infringement.”). 
 111  Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1138 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 112  Id. at 1120. 
 113  Id. (quoting Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 114  Id. 
 115  Id. (holding that “the Gayes’ copyright is not limited to only thin copyright protection”). 
 116  Id. at 1138. 
 117  Id. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Id. at 1107. 
 120  Id. at 1125. 
 121  Id. 
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b. The Dissent 
Judge Nguyen’s dissent sharply disagreed with the majority’s reasoning and 
conclusions; also, much of her criticisms and arguments embody the general 
consensus across multiple sectors that the Ninth Circuit wrongly decided The 
Blurred Lines Case.122  Focusing significantly more on the musical elements of the 
two works than the majority, Judge Nguyen criticized the majority’s analysis for 
the following reasons.  First,  by deciding the case on purely procedural grounds, 
the majority missed the actual issue at hand—whether attempting to evoke a 
“Marvin Gaye style” crossed the legal line into infringement.  Second, the 
majority failed to distinguish what elements of “Got To Give It Up” should have 
received protection.  Finally, even if all the elements of Gaye’s song were 
protectable, the combination of those elements do not satisfy the substantial 
similarity standard.123 
Judge Nguyen’s sharpest words for the majority still echoes among critics of 
The Blurred Lines Case decision today.  In her opinion she states that “the majority 
establishe[d] a dangerous precedent that strikes a devastating blow to future 
musicians and composers everywhere.”124  In creating this precedent, Nyguyen 
continues, “the majority allowed a musical style or ‘groove’ to be copyrighted,” 
which will ultimately create a chilling effect on creativity.125  As described in the 
introduction, this is an ongoing and contentious debate in the music industry.126  
For the purposes of this Note, however, it is a framework for analyzing the issue 
at hand:  whether this potential trend of an unprecedented scope of copyright 
protection will spill over into other areas of copyright law, specifically film and 
motion pictures.  
III. ANALYSIS 
The focus of this Note’s analysis shifts to a different area of copyright law: 
film and motion pictures.  First, this Note discusses and analyzes the current 
state of film copyright law.  Second, based on my findings, this Note predicts the 
relative likelihood of a post-Blurred Lines landscape spilling over into in the film 
industry.  Finally, this Note analyzes whether a disparity in how different works 
are treated under copyright exists and considers whether any such differential 
treatment should be permitted. 
 
 122  Id. at 1138 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). 
 123  Quagliariello, supra note 99, at 140-41. 
 124  Williams, 895 F.3d at 1138. 
 125  Quagliariello, supra note 99101, at 141. 
 126  See supra Part I (noting the tension between creativity and ownership rights inherent in 
copyright protection). 
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A. COPYRIGHT LAW AND FILM 
The previous discussion of The Blurred Lines Case prompts an even more 
specific question within the broader one presented here: what aspects of film 
could leave the industry susceptible to a copyright infringement claim, and 
subsequent decision, like Blurred Lines?  By analyzing recent copyright 
infringement cases in the film industry, this section seeks to exemplify the 
possible opportunities for the controversy from the music industry to spread into 
film.  Before conducting this analysis, it is important to first acknowledge a key 
caveat in this area of copyright law: the scènes à faire doctrine.  Translated as 
“scenes which must be done,”127 this doctrine provides that copyright protection 
does not extend to “similarity of incidents or plot that necessarily follow[] from 
a common theme or setting.”128  For example, where two works shared common 
themes such as “electrified fences” and “dinosaur nurseries,” no infringement 
was found because they “flowed from the concept of a dinosaur zoo.”129  
As a result of this doctrine, factfinders automatically treat copyright 
infringement claims concerning film differently than those that deal with music.  
Specifically, it appears that the scènes à faire doctrine works against liberal 
copyright awards to plaintiffs by forcing the factfinder to filter through the 
unprotected elements and tease out the soundness of a plaintiff’s claim.  In other 
words, the scènes à faire doctrine operates as a preliminary inquiry and, 
ultimately, a mitigating factor on the difficulties of the substantial similarity 
prong.  
 
1. Marcus v. ABC Signature Studios, Inc. 
In Marcus v. ABC Signature Studios, Inc., the works disputed concerned two 
different television scripts about a family moving to a new neighborhood and 
navigating “black” stereotypes.130  In Marcus, Plaintiff alleged that defendant used 
plaintiff’s submission of a script in a screenwriter contest sponsored by 
defendant’s production company to develop the pilot for an ABC series called 
Black-ish.131  Plaintiff’s infringement claim primarily focused on similarities 
between the theme and plot of the two works.132  
The circuit court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss, stating that “[a] 
work’s theme is its overarching message,” and thus, “[t]here is no protection for 
 
 127  4 NIMMER, supra note 61, at § 13.03[B][4] (quoting Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 
85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 1949)). 
 128  Id. 
 129  Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 130  Marcus v. ABC Signature Studios, Inc., 279 F.Supp. 3d 1056, 1059-60 (C.D. Cal. 2017). 
 131  Id. at 1059. 
 132  Id. at 1059-61. 
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stock themes or themes that flow necessarily from a basic premise.”133  For 
example, the court acknowledged that the two works shared the element of 
“acting black”; but, because it did not exist as an underlying message in the 
works, the court denied that this constituted a theme.134  Furthermore, since any 
attempts by characters in defendant’s work to use dialogue to “act black” were 
“extremely brief,” they were “not a large point of contention” in the plot.135  
Additionally, in Marcus, the court stated that the similar themes of “moving into 
the majority culture [and] constantly feel[ing] . . . out of place” did not amount 
to infringement because it arose from a basic plot idea.136  Therefore, it was not 
protected, and the court was required to “disregard [the theme of feeling out of 
place] . . . in looking at Plaintiff’s ability to plead substantial similarity.”137  The 
Marcus court also rejected claims of substantial similarity regarding the plots of 
the two works.138  For instance, the court stated that the shared elements of 
characters from both works receiving internal promotions at their jobs and the 
show’s subsequent exploration of the “characters’ reactions to those 
promotions” were “basic plot ideas . . . ‘not protected by copyright law.’”139  
 
2. Sheldon Abend Revocable Trust v. Spielberg 
In Sheldon Abend Revocable Trust v. Spielberg, plaintiff brought an infringement 
action alleging that Spielberg’s motion picture, Disturbia, infringed on plaintiff’s 
copyright in a short story entitled Rear Window and “the derivative Alfred 
Hitchcock film of the same name.”140  The court granted defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment.141  
While the court did not explicitly refer to the scènes à faire doctrine, the 
court’s influence is implicit within its reasoning.  Prior to applying the substantial 
similarity test, the court stated that where, as in Sheldon, “a work is an 
amalgamation of protectible and unprotectible elements,” the court must “first 
filter [the unprotectible elements] out from consideration.”142  For example, the 
court reasoned that the similarity of plot points of “peril” and “suspense” 
 
 133  Id. at 1067 (quoting Silas v. Home Box Off., Inc., 201 F.Supp. 3d 1158, 1180 (C.D.Cal., 
2016)). 
 134  Id. 
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. at 1068. 
 137  Id. 
 138  Id. at 1065-66. 
 139  Id. at 1067 (quoting Campbell v. Walt Disney Co., 718 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1112 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010)). 
 140  Sheldon Abend Revocable Tr. v. Spielberg, 748 F.Supp. 2d 200, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 141  Id. 
 142  Id. at 204. 
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between the two works was “broad” and at a “level of generality [that] is not 
probative for the question of infringement.”143 
These cases are just a snippet of the overarching theme observed in copyright 
cases in the film industry.  Taken together, it appears that the application of 
copyright protection is much more restrained in the film industry.  The scènes à 
faire doctrine explains this difference, since it operates as a filter on a plaintiff’s 
claim, with the principal effect of extracting the protectable elements of the work 
from the unprotectable ones.  Thus, the substantial similarity inquiry is much 
more precise and consistent in infringement cases regarding the film industry. 
It follows, therefore, that film artists are engaged in a much more stable 
industry that is not susceptible to a decision like The Blurred Lines Case.  If true, 
then it also follows that the prospect of a spillover of any potential “chilling 
effect” on creativity from the music to film industry is also quite slim.  
Accordingly, does this mean that different kinds of works are treated differently 
under copyright?  If so, is this apparent differential treatment an acceptable 
feature of copyright law? Or, should it be troubling?  The following section seeks 
to assess these and similar questions.  
B. DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT BETWEEN KINDS OF WORKS 
As discussed in the preceding section, it appears that infringement cases in 
this area are not susceptible to the same kind of uncertainty that currently 
pervades the music industry.  Therefore, a disparity in treatment among various 
works in copyright does appear to exist.  The next inquiry, then, is whether this 
disparity in treatment under copyright should be acceptable.  
The differential treatment is unacceptable for two reasons.  First, consider 
the plain language of the Copyright Act. § 102 of the Copyright Act lists 
categories of works of authorship that are subject to copyright protection and 
conveys the idea-expression dichotomy as a limitation on protection.  This 
section does not provide any notion or indication that the extent of copyright 
protection may vary across the categories of works of authorship.  Thus, 
differential treatment constitutes a misinterpretation and misapplication of the 
Copyright Act.  
Second, differential treatment of protected works conflicts with common 
understandings of fairness.  Allowing differential treatment among works of 
authorship creates the implication that certain works of authorship are more 
deserving of protection than others.  This implication is problematic because it 
could create a de facto hierarchy among infringement claims, communicating 
that some kinds of creative works are more worthy of protection than others.  
Consequently, plaintiffs may opt to forgo the time and expense of litigation.  
Plaintiffs may reasonably infer from the collective body of infringement case law 
 
 143  Id. at 208. 
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that courts predetermine the merits of a claim on the basis of what kind of 
protected work is at issue rather than whether infringement actually occurred.  
Hierarchical protections, whether perceived or actual, within copyright may also 
leave many authors feeling unmotivated to protect their creative works through 
registration at all.  In particular, the registration process may seem futile to 
authors within “lesser valued” categories, since they could not reasonably expect 
to also enjoy the full force of protections guaranteed by the Copyright Act.  
Therefore, differential treatment of protected works is fundamentally unfair as it 
may create substantial uncertainty for some authors’ ability to assert and/or 
maintain valid ownership rights of their creative works.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
After The Blurred Lines Case, panic spread throughout the music industry. 
Many perceived the decision as a dangerous expansion of copyright protection. 
Specifically, it was inferred from the majority’s opinion that the “groove” or 
“feel” of a song could now be protected under copyright.  Thus, it was asserted 
that the ultimate implication of the decision would be a chilling effect on 
creativity in the industry because songwriters would now create their works with 
uncertainty of litigation.  
While a great deal of attention has been given to the implications of this 
decision in the music industry, the impact of The Blurred Lines Case in other areas 
of copyright has received little attention, especially in film and motion picture. 
As assessed in the preceding section, it appears that possible implications of The 
Blurred Lines Case are contained within the music industry.  In particular, the 
application of copyright protection is much more restrained in the film industry, 
because the scènes à faire doctrine operates as a filter on a plaintiff’s claim, with 
the principal effect of extracting the protectable elements of the work from the 
unprotectable ones.  
Consequently, a disparity in treatment among works exists in copyright law.  
Allowing differential treatment among works of authorship creates the 
implication that certain works of authorship are more deserving of protection 
than others.  These findings prompt the following questions:  should particular 
measures should be taken to address the disparity?  If so, by what means?  This 
Note does not seek to answer these questions; instead, this Note considers the 
probability of a particular trend in one area of copyright, spreading into another.  
The findings presented indicate that the probability is slight, because a disparity 
of treatment exists among protected works in copyright.  Thus, further research, 
study, and analysis of this current landscape in copyright law, which is beyond 
the scope of this Note, is necessary to answer these two questions.  In the 
meantime, the line between paying homage and copyright infringement is an 
increasingly blurred, litigiously risky, and expensive one to test.  Singer-
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songwriters, musicians, and producers alike should tread lightly in their creative 
process:  that “groove” you are using may be a hit in more than one way.   
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